Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1990

The State of Utah v. Terry Wayne Perdue : Reply
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Dan R. Larsen; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Andrew A. Valdez; Charles F. Loyd, Jr.; Ronald S. Fujino; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association;
Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Perdue, No. 900081 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2468

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

._
UTAH
DOCUMENT

BRIEF

s,Fu

qom\

*> IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

-NO:
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 900081-CA
Priority No. 2

TERRY WAYNE PERDUE,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Criminal
Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1988), in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Frank G. Noel, Judge, presiding.

ANDREW A. VALDEZ
CHARLES F. LOYD, JR.
RONALD S. FUJINO
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
R. PAUL VAN DAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
DAN R. LARSEN
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellee

NOV 2t9Q 0

Ulffih (j#t.,rt

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
I'] ri i nl ill . Appel Jee,
v.
Case N o . 900081-CA
Priority N o . ~

TERRY WAYNE PERDUE,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Criminal
Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, a first degree felony, in
i (ii.U'

(1988)

the Third Judicial

District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State ol Utah

i-be

Honorable Frank G. Noel, Judge, presiding.

ANDREW A. VALDEZ
CHARLES F. LOYD, .
RONALD S. FUJINO
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER A8SOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

R. PAUL VAN DAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
DAN R. LARSEN
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

INTRODUCTION

1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

1

ARGUMENT
POINT. THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGES REGARDING THE JURY
INSTRUCTIONS.
CONCLUSION

2
17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES CITED
Francis v. Franklin. 471 U.S. 307 (1985)

13, 14, 15

State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1989)

4

State v. Haston. Case No. 900021-CA (argued orally
September 25, 1990)
State v. Ireland. 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989)
State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989)

5
10, 11, 12,
13, 15, 16
9, 10, 12,
13, 16

State v. Miller. 727 P.2d 203 (Utah 1986)
State V. Mills. 606 P.2d 1111 (N.M. App. 1980)

7, 8
...

State v. Moore. 782 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989)
State v. Parsons. 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989)
State v. Reedv. 681 P.2d 1251 (Utah 1984)

6, 7
7, 8
6
7, 8

State v. Suarez. 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (Utah App.
1990)

3, 4

State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987)
State v. Turner. 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1987) . . .
United States v. Pinkney. 551 F.2d 1241 (D.C. Cir.
1976)

11

6
15
9

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 900081-CA
Priority No. 2

TERRY WAYNE PERDUE,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant Terry Wayne Perdue relies on his
opening brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the
statements of jurisdiction, the issues, the case, and the facts.
Appellant responds to the State's answer to his opening brief as
follows.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant Terry Perdue objected to the jury instructions
during an "in-chambers" off the record discussion with the State and
the trial court.

Thereafter, the court acknowledged for the record

that Terry Perdue had made his exceptions.

Terry Perdue then

submitted only one exception, focusing mainly on the reasonable
doubt instruction.

In contrast to the position taken by the State,

Terry Perdue submits that a negative definition is not enough.

The

defective self defense instruction also compounded the inadequate
instructions concerning the burden of proof.
deprived Terry Perdue of a fair trial.

These inadequacies

ARGUMENT
POINT
THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE DEFENDANTS
CHALLENGES REGARDING THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS
(Reply to Point I & II of Appellee/s Brief)
In its brief, the State requested this Court to reject
Terry Purdue's arguments concerning the challenged jury
instructions.

Appellee's brief at 9.

The State argued that

defendant Perdue had not properly preserved his issues on appeal.
Appellee's brief at 9-16.

The State's criticisms stemmed, in part,

from the objections made at trial.
Following the presentation of closing arguments, the
respective parties and the court discussed the propriety of the jury
instructions in the judge's chambers.

(T 280). The "in chambers"

conference was conducted off the record.

(T 280). Thereafter, the

court acknowledged for the record that Perdue had made and modified
multiple exceptions relating to the proposed jury instructions.
(T 281). Perdue could not recall all of the exceptions although he
did except to the reasonable doubt instruction:
The Court: . . . Gentlemen, one other thing while we
have the record. We have met in chambers, we have
discussed jury instructions and exceptions have been
made to jury instructions prior to this time. I
believe that you would now like to make those a part
of the record; is that correct?
Mr. Valdez [Defense counsel]:

Yes, your honor.

Mr. MacDougall [Prosecutor]: The State would have no
exceptions, your honor.
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Mr. Valdez: It's my understanding we had made two
exceptions to jury instructions. And I can only see
one here. But the first exception would be to the
instruction the court gave on reasonable doubt, and
I'll mark that as Exception #1 and provide that to the
court. Basically it's a longer version of the
instruction the court gave and has more of a
clarification we believe and also contains some cites
of authority that we think supports our position.
The Court:
file.

I believe it is in the packet with the

Mr. Valdez: I believe it is. There should be one
more exceptionf but I can't recall at this point what
it was. Well, I guess that's it. I can't recall the
other exception. Was there one or two, do you recall,
Judge?
The Court: I recall you making them in chambers, but
we modified some of the exceptions.
Mr. Valdez: I think that's the only exception, so
with that we'll submit it.
The Court:

Very well, court will be in recess.

(T 280-81) (emphasis added); Appellee's brief at 14.
The above exchange reflects that Terry Perdue did in fact
except to the jury instructions during the in chambers conference.
The court referred repeatedly to his exceptions in the plural tense,
and not as a singular challenge.

The State had no exceptions.

Perdue's exception was made in a manner similar to an off the record
objection allowed in State v. Suarez, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 64,
67 nn. 3 & 5 (Utah App. 1990).

In Suarez, this Court explained:

Despite the incomplete nature of the record, it is
apparent that defense counsel made an earlier, timely
objection. . . . [W]hen defense counsel asked to
place her objection on the record, the court
accommodated her request and accepted without comment
her representation that the objection had been timely
made but not recorded. We may infer from the court's
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silence that defense counsel in fact made the earlier
objection in a timely manner as she stated. Although
the side bar conference should have been recorded,
defense counsel's later comments on the record were
sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.
Id. at 67 n.5 (citation omitted); see also State v. Dibello, 780
P.2d 1221, 1229 n.9 (Utah 1989) (where defense counsel preserved his
issue for appeal by stating, on the record, "I previously stated my
objection in chambers [off the record] to that [admitting a
videotape into evidence and] the court overruled that objection").
Similarly, in the present case defense counsel's comments
made on the record also preserved the issue for appeal.

Indeed, the

trial court here did even more than the trial court in Suarez.

The

Suarez trial court simply accommodated defense counsel's request to
place an objection on the record.

The trial court here initiated

the request.
The court would not have acted in such a manner if Terry
Perdue had not previously made a timely and specific objection, nor
would it have allowed defense counsel to complain of the reasonable
doubt instruction if it believed that his exception would "invite
error."

Instead, the court accepted without clarification defendant

Perdue's references to the "instruction the court gave" and even
acknowledged that "it is in the packet with the file."

(T 281).

Moreover, prior to opening statements (i.e. before defense counsel
submitted his proposed jury instructions), the court read a
reasonable doubt instruction virtually identical to the contested
instruction.

Compare (T 13-14) with (R 114).
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Accordingly, the

involved instruction1 may have been a court instruction placed in
the defendant's "packet" of proposed instructions or it may actually
have been part of defense counsel's instructions.

That fact is

subject to reasonable dispute given the court's apparent
acquiescence to the representations made by defendant Perdue and the
circumstances surrounding the instruction.

Hence, in contrast to

the attacks made by the State, Terry Perdue did not "materially
[misrepresent] the record on appeal by claiming that '[t]he trial
court . . . deleted the last three paragraphs of Appellant's
proposed instructions and modified the first two paragraphs.'"
Appellee's brief at 11.
However, for purposes of discussion, Terry Perdue will
assume the State was correct in claiming that the trial court was
not the author of the reasonable doubt instruction.
brief at 11 n.2.

But see (T 13-14).

Appellee's

Assuming the State was

technically correct, Terry Perdue's arguments are still
substantively sound because of the court's rejection of the long
version of his proposed reasonable doubt instruction.

(R 60, 61);

(T 281). By rejecting the longer version in favor of the shorter
version, the court's actions effectively deleted the last three

1

The involved instruction, (R 59, 114), is a standard
instruction used frequently by the trial courts. See, e.g.,
State v. Haston. Case No. 900021-CA (argued orally September 25,
1990) (the reasonable doubt instruction used there was submitted by
the trial court and identical to the instruction questioned today).
Part of the jury instruction arguments in Haston were excerpted for
use in the instant action. Because of the similarities between the
two cases, reference to the Haston case may lend guidance for the
resolution of this appeal.
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paragraphs of the reasonable doubt instruction and modified the
first two paragraphs.

By approving the shorter instruction, the

court remained nonetheless responsible for substantial editing
changes and revisions.
The State also criticized the defendant7s jury instruction
challenges with the following quotation and authority:

n/

[W]e

reemphasize this Court's past decisions wherein we stated that
7

invited error7 is procedurally unjustified and viewed with

disfavor.7

State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987)."

Appellee's brief at 9.

The State, however, failed to include the

rest of the quoted phrase.

The Tillman phrase continued with an

example of when the doctrine should be invoked.

The doctrine is

"viewed with disfavor, especially where ample opportunity has been
afforded to avoid such a result."

750 P.2d at 560-61.

The Tillman Court invoked the doctrine because the defense
counsel there, unlike defendant Perdue here, did not refer to a
prior off the record in-chambers discussion.

Compare Tillman, 750

P.2d at 560-61 with (T 281); see also State v. Parsons. 781 P.2d
1275, 1285 (Utah 1989) (where the court specifically asked defense
counsel if he was "waiving any possible prejudice resulting from [a
juror/witness] conversation" to which defense counsel affirmatively
responded).

Terry Perdue did record an exception.

(T 281). At

least in terms of the reasonable doubt instruction, this fact
distinguishes the many cases cited by the State.

See Appellee7s

brief 9-12; see also State v. Mills. 606 P.2d 1111, 1112 (N.M. App.
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1980) (since defendant Mills could not complain about a trial court
giving his requested instruction which included his desired phrase,
the Mills case is inapposite as the trial court here would not give
defendant Perdue's requested instruction [i.e. the longer version]
until his desired phrases were excluded).

The State also wrote:

Defendant actually submitted two proposed instructions
on reasonable doubt and two proposed instructions on
self defense.2 (R. 59, 60, 93, 94) The trial court
chose one of each, mindful that a defendant is not
entitled to multiple instructions on the same issue.
State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989); State
v. Miller. 727 P.2d 203, 206 (Utah 1986). See also
State v. Reedv, 681 P.2d 1251, 1253 (Utah 1984)
Appellee's brief at 11 (footnote added); see also Appellant's
opening brief, Addenda A-D.

The State misconstrues its cited

authority.
In State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989), defense
counsel there, unlike defendant Perdue here, did not make
alternative arguments to the court.

Rather, defendant Moore

proposed a jury instruction which defined what did not constitute
"distribution for value."

782 P.2d at 499.

The court rejected his

instruction, replacing it instead with an instruction which
affirmatively defined the term.

id. at 500.

On appeal, the Utah

Supreme Court found that defendant Moore was not entitled to both
instructions:

"The court adequately defined distribution for value

in instruction No. 5.

The court then did not need to define what is

See infra note 3 and accompanying text.
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not value for purposes of the statute since any distribution which
did not come within the definition of 'for value' would be 'without
value.'"

Id. (emphasis in original).
The converse of the Moore principles, however, would not

hold true in the present situation.

The very fact that the

definition for reasonable doubt fell within the definition for the
lesser civil standards made the definition inadequate.

Moreover,

the trial court in Moore, unlike the trial court here, approved the
instruction affirmatively defining the term.

Had the trial court

here approved the longer instruction with the affirmative
definition, the State's cited authority could apply.

But since the

trial court rejected the longer version and because negative
definitions were not enough, the State's authority is inapplicable
to the case at bar.

None of the cited authority would have

precluded defendant Perdue from making alternative arguments if the
first proposed instruction was rejected (i.e. if his first
instruction was accepted, Terry Perdue could not also ask for
another instruction on the same theory).

Cf. State v. Moore, 782

P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989); State v. Miller, 727 P.2d 203, 206 (Utah
1986) (in Miller, "other instructions given in the case amply set
forth the law on the issues[,]" which contrasts with Terry Perdue's
instructions because the other instructions further misled the jury
on the appropriate burden of proof); State v. Reedv, 681 P.2d 1251,
1253 (Utah 1984) (in Reedy, the Court held, "it is not error to
refuse an instruction if its content is set out in others[,]" which
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also contrasts with Terry Perdue's situation because neither the
short version, nor any of the other instructions set forth the
substance stated in the long version).
In regards to the self defense instruction, Terry Perdue
respectfully requests this Court to address the self defense
instruction because of the circumstances surrounding the objection3
and its direct impact on the reasonable doubt instruction.

See also

Appellant's opening brief, Point I.E.; United States v. Pinknev, 551
F.2d 1241, 1246 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("the prejudice caused a
defendant by error does not somehow evaporate or diminish simply
because his counsel has failed to object"); cf. State v. Johnson,
774 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Utah 1989) ("jury instructions are to be
considered as a whole").
The State acknowledges but is not in agreement with Terry
Perdue's claim of "manifest injustice" as a basis for reviewing the
jury instruction challenges.

Appellee's brief at 15-16.

Pursuant

to the explanation above, the trial court and this Court may have

3

Terry Perdue did submit two proposed instructions but
it appears to be more than a coincidence that he also initially
believed he "had made two exceptions to [the] jury instructions[,]"
(T 281) ; that the Court acknowledged Perdue "making them in
chambers, but we modified some of the exceptions[,]" (T 281); and
that at least two modified versions pertained to self defense. See
(R 93, 94); see also Appellant's opening brief, Addenda C & D.
Other modifications did exist, but none were as central to the
defendant's theory of the case as the self defense instructions.
While Terry Perdue ultimately submitted only one exception to the
court, (T 281), his initial belief, the court's comments, and the
facts revealed by the record suggest that Perdue made the proper
objection in-chambers but then could not recall it for the record.
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already recognized the preservation of the issues.

In the

alternative, however, no one could reasonably argue that manifest
injustice would not have resulted from a reasonable doubt
instruction which used a civil standard of proof for a criminal
conviction, or a self defense instruction which shifted to the
defendant the burden of persuasion.
The State did not address the propriety of the challenged
instructions, even in the alternative, except to the extent that it
believed that a negative means of defining "reasonable doubt" was
proper.

In footnote four of its brief, the State wrote:
Justice Stewart has criticized using the language
"weighty affairs of life" in defining reasonable
doubt. rState v.1 Johnson, 774 P.2d [1141,] 1148
(Stewart, J., concurring); \State v."| Ireland, 773
P.2d [1375,] 1381 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). [Defendant Perdue's] other proposed
instruction used the language "weighty affairs of
life" in defining what the reasonable doubt standard
was not. The State considers this negative method of
defining a distinction without a difference.

Appellee's brief at 15 n.4 (emphasis in original).

The State's

argument is without merit.
The long version of the reasonable doubt instruction did
more than negatively define the term; the long version affirmatively
defined the certainty required for a "reasonable doubt" decision by
telling the jurors that they "must have a greater assurance of [the]
correctness of [their] decision than [they] normally have in making
the weighty decisions in [their lives]."

(R 60-61) (emphasis

added); see Appellant's opening brief, Addendum B.

In contrast, the

short version contains little more than negative definitions or
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phrases equally applicable to both civil and criminal proceedings.
(R 114); see Appellants opening brief, Addendum A.

By defining

what a reasonable doubt was not, the short version contained no
minimal level of proof other than "merely fanciful or imaginary" or
"a wholly speculative possibility."

(R 114).

The standard of proof

for civil trials must also be above these minimal levels.

Negative

definitions4 are wholly inadequate.
Not only did the court deny Terry Perdue the use of his
long version, it also effectively precluded him from using examples
(e.g. getting married, buying a home) during his closing arguments
which would have emphasized the seriousness of the jurors'
decision.

Although an individual must carefully consider such

"weighty" decisions, they pale in comparison to the type of
certainty required for proof "beyond a reasonable doubt."

See State

v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1381 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) ("Nothing that one ordinarily does in the course of a

4

If someone attempted to define his or her wealth, "rich
beyond your wildest dreams" (i.e. "proof beyond a reasonable doubt11)
in a manner distinguishable from "well off" (i.e. "clear and
convincing"), he or she must do more than define the amount as less
than the national debt (i.e. "proof to an absolute certainty").
Such a negative definition would also apply to the salary of an
attorney in the S.L. Legal Defender Association (i.e. "merely
fanciful or imaginary").
However, if the individual defined the wealth with a
standard, the $100 million dollar lottery for example (i.e. the
"weighty affairs of life"), and explained that "rich beyond your
wildest dreams" was more than the lottery proceeds (but not as much
as the national debt), the listener has a complete understanding of
the term. Without the longer explanatory version, the negative
definition could apply to any amount of money.
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normal life span is comparable to the decision to deprive another of
either his or her life or liberty by voting to convict for a
crime").

Terry Perdue was denied his opportunity to so inform the

jury.
Without the clarification provided by the longer version,
Terry Perdue could not have been convicted under the required
criminal standard of proof unless the term, "reasonable doubt," is
deemed self-explanatory and not subject to definition.

"Reasonable

doubt," however, is a concept foreign to the average layperson
selected to sit on a jury.

Although the term is used and heard

frequently through various means of communication (e.g. newspapers,
television, and radio), the term is never adequately defined.5
The State also contends that the "proposed instruction [the
long version] offered by defendant [Perdue] contains language
similar to that rejected by a majority of the Utah Supreme Court."
Appellee's brief at 15. The State misread each decision.
In both Ireland and Johnson, the appellate arguments
submitted by counsel focused on issues entirely different than those
present in the case at bar.

Both cases did not involve an

affirmative defense, like the self defense theory of Terry Perdue

5

Perhaps a helpful analogy can be gleaned through the
use of the terms, "pregnant" or "labor pains." These terms, like
the "reasonable doubt" term, are used and heard everyday in the
community. But husbands, like the average juror, would be remiss in
believing that they knew what the terms meant absent an adequate
explanation. (i.e. an expectant mother would have to do more than
explain that "it doesn't feel good.")
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Moreover, the Ireland and Johnson cases would not have
required the jurors to find that the State had disproved the
defendant's theory.

All the State had to prove in those two cases

was the persuasiveness of its prima facie case.

In Terry Perdue's

trial, however, the self defense instruction improperly required him
to "bring forward some evidence" in support of his theory and then
to do so in such a "fashion" that the jury would be convinced of his
innocence—and not of his guilt.
brief, Addendum C.

(R 129); see Appellant's opening

The instruction relieved the State of its burden

of proof and shifted the burden of persuasion to Terry Perdue.

The

error was especially glaring because the State not only conceded the
viability of Mr. Perdue's theory, it also agreed that the evidence
did in fact support his claim of self defense:
Hermansen [the person who was shot] had the gun and
was reloading it during the argument. Defendant
[Perdue] watched Hermansen load three bullets into the
gun. Defendant demanded that Hermansen return the
keys. Hermansen refused. Considering himself in
danger, defendant hit Hermansen with his fist and took
the revolver.
Appellee's brief at 4 (citations omitted and emphasis added); see
also Appellant's opening brief at 5, 27.
Unlike the situation in Ireland and Johnson, the language
used in the Perdue instructions could not have corrected the
improper misstatements of law for both the reasonable doubt
instruction and the self defense instruction.

Furthermore, the

State here and the Ireland and Johnson decisions completely ignored
the United States Supreme Court decision of Francis v. Franklin, 471
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U.S. 307 (1985), a case of fundamental importance to the present
action.

See also Appellant's opening brief, Point I.D.
In Francis, the Court held unconstitutional the use of a

mandatory rebuttable presumption which was contained in just two
sentences of the entire charge read to the jury.

471 U.S. at 318.

When the jury instructions were read as a whole, the two sentences
still improperly shifted to the defendant the burden of persuasion
on the critical element of intent, despite a "portion of the charge
instructing the jurors that the defendant was presumed innocent and
that the State was required to prove every element of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt."

Id. at 319.

The dissenting opinions of

Francis also noted that the instructions "repeatedly reiterated the
presumption of innocence and the heavy burden imposed upon the
Statef,]" 471 U.S. at 329 (Powell, J., dissenting), and that "the
judge admonished the jury at least four separate times that they
could convict only if they found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
Id. at 332 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and
O'Connor, J.).
Nevertheless, the Francis Court explained, "Language that
merely contradicts and does not explain a constitutionally infirm
instruction will not suffice to absolve the infirmity.

A reviewing

court has no way of knowing which of the two irreconcilable
instructions the jurors applied in reaching their verdict.
Francis v. Franklin. 471 U.S. 307, 323 (1985).

The Francis

principles apply with even greater force here because the multiple

- 14 -

defects of Terry Perdue's instructions are far greater than the two
defective sentences of the Francis instructions.

In addition, the

federal standards would not have required the State to disprove an
affirmative defense claim of the defendant as the State here was
required to do with Terry Perdue's claim of self defense.

See

generally Appellant's opening brief, Point I.E.
In State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1987), this
Court acknowledged the Francis opinion in support of its decision to
strike down another jury instruction which improperly shifted the
burden of proof to the defendant.

In Turner, the Court found that

even though "[t]he prosecution's 'burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt all of the elements of the crimes charged' was
recited in Instructions 7 and 9, and repeated in Instructions 10 and
11," of defendant Turner's jury instructions, id. at 1044 n.l, the
"boilerplate explanations" could not absolve the constitutionally
infirm instructions.

Id. at 1045 (construing Francis v. Franklin,

471 U.S. 307 (1985)).
Similarly, the boilerplate explanations stated here could
not have corrected the negatively phrased reasonable doubt
instruction and the improperly worded self defense instruction in a
manner which would have not had affected the outcome of the trial.
In summary, the State cannot claim that the "instruction offered by
defendant contains language similar to that rejected by a majority
of the Utah Supreme Court[,]" Appellee's brief at 15, without
considering the application of Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307
(1985), and the vast differences between this case and the Ireland
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and Johnson decisions.

The issues of Ireland and Johnson were fully

opposed on appeal; the issues here were disputed on little more than
unjustified procedural grounds.

The State offered no substantive

reasons for upholding the instructions and essentially conceded the
importance of the self defense instruction by admitting that Terry
Perdue "consider[ed] himself in danger, . . . "
at 4.

Appellee's brief

The errors were neither corrected, nor specifically addressed

by the general "curative" language stated elsewhere in the
instructions.

Terry Perdue did not receive a fair trial.

The jury began their deliberations on October 3, 1989, at
5:20 p.m.

(T 279). Following approximately 4 hours and 40 minutes

of deliberation, the court excused the jury for evening recess.
(T 283). The jurors left for their homes at 9:58 p.m.

(T 283).

They returned the next day, October 4, 1989, at approximately
10:15 a.m.

(T 284). The jury then continued their deliberations

until 1:09 p.m.

(T 284). After deliberating for approximately 7

hours and 30 minutes, the jury finally returned their verdict.
jurors' decision was not an easy one.6

6

The

If their verdict resulted

If self defense was found to be inapplicable, a
"manslaughter" verdict would have been proper and more likely under
an appropriate standard of proof. See Appellant's opening brief,
Point II. The State misinterprets the cases cited in support of a
lesser included offense conviction. Appellee's brief at 18 n.5.
Because of the similarities between the circumstances in the cited
cases and the circumstances in the present case, the defendant here,
like the defendants there, should have been convicted of
manslaughter. The actions taken by Terry Perdue after the shooting
could have also been consistent with a finding of manslaughter, as
opposed to second degree murder.
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from either a standard of proof less demanding than the requisite
"beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof, or a defective self
defense instruction, or both, manifest injustice occurred.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Terry Wayne Perdue
respectfully requests that his conviction be reversed and the case
remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this

day of November, 1990.
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